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1.
Health, Risk & Society ; 25(3-4):129-150, 2023.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-20244927

ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic has become a partisan issue rather than an independent public health issue in the US. This study examined the behavioural consequences of motivated reasoning and framing by investigating the impacts of COVID-19 news exposure and news frames, as apparent through a Latent Dirichlet topic modelling analysis of local news coverage, on state-level preventive behaviours as understood through a nationally representative survey. Findings suggested that the media effects on various preventive behaviours differed. The overall exposure rate to all COVID-19 news articles increased mask-wearing but did not significantly impact other preventive behaviours. Four news frames significantly increased avoiding contact or avoiding public or crowded places. However, news articles discussing anxiety and stay at home order triggered resistance and countereffects and led to risky behaviours. ‘Solid Republican' state residents were less likely to avoid contact, avoid public or crowded places, and wear masks. However, partisan leanings did not interfere with the impact of differing local COVID-19 news frames on reported preventive behaviours. Plus, statements regarding pre-existing trust in Trump did not correlate with reported preventive behaviour. Attention to effect sizes revealed that news exposure and news frames could have a bigger impact on health behaviours than motivated reasoning.

2.
Philosophical Psychology ; 36(5):969-989, 2023.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-20235729

ABSTRACT

Some collective irrationalities, like epistemically and pragmatically reckless Covid skepticism, are especially dangerous. While we normally have incentives to avoid dangerous beliefs, there are cases in which the danger of a belief is valuable. This is not captured by most accounts of motivated reasoning. I argue that Covid skepticism can function as a costly signal (handicap) so as to more effectively communicate social identity and commitment.

3.
J Econ Behav Organ ; 211: 386-400, 2023 Jul.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2325015

ABSTRACT

We report the results of an experiment on willful information avoidance regarding measures to address Covid-19. In the experiment, participants choose between two options, each associated with a contribution to the Corona Fund of the Red Cross USA and a payment to the participant. Depending on the treatment, either the participants' payoff, the donation, both or none of these pieces of information were hidden, but revealable. With this design, we can separate motivated reasons for ignorance from non-motivated reasons, both of which are present in our data. Furthermore, we find evidence of both self-serving and pro-social information avoidance. These behavioral patterns correlate with the subjects' political attitudes: while voters of the Democratic Party are prone to exhibit pro-social information avoidance, Republican voters rather engage in self-serving information avoidance.

4.
Polit Psychol ; 2022 Oct 27.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2323219

ABSTRACT

Existing research has focused extensively on the role of emotions such as anger, fear, and enthusiasm in explaining public opinion, but less is known about the importance of disgust, an innate disease-related emotion. To study the independent and joint effects of disgust and information, I draw on the case of the COVID-19 pandemic. I demonstrate that experimentally induced incidental disgust and exposure to information about how to flatten the curve of the COVID-19 cases have distinctive effects on political, racial, and health attitudes. Independently, exposure to information affects preferences only for restrictive policies to fight the spread of the virus. In contrast, the stand-alone effect of incidental disgust, as well as its joint effect with exposure to information, are responsible for attitude change toward both pandemic-relevant and irrelevant policies, Asian minorities, and prevention measures. Importantly, the study finds that citizens respond symmetrically to disgusting stimuli and information across degrees of political awareness, ideology, partisan affiliation, and trait authoritarianism. The results draw attention to the far-reaching implications of disgust on public opinion under threatening conditions.

5.
American Behavioral Scientist ; 2023.
Article in English | Scopus | ID: covidwho-2299932

ABSTRACT

This study analyzed data from a Pew survey (N = 5,681) to see how party identification, political knowledge, and use of different news sources related to two beliefs about COVID-19 promoted on the right early in the pandemic: that the virus was created in a laboratory and that a vaccine for it would be available within a few months. Republicans were more likely to hold these beliefs. The more that people used news outlets with right-leaning audiences, the more likely they were to hold those two beliefs. The more they used news with left-leaning audiences, the less likely they were to believe the virus was laboratory made, a relationship stronger among Democrats. Political knowledge appeared to discourage believing the virus was laboratory-made, again more so among Democrats. However, the more that Democrats (but not Republicans) used news with bipartisan audiences, the more likely they were to believe the virus was laboratory made. Similarly, the more that Democrats (but not Republicans) used social media for news, the more they believed a vaccine would be available soon, and right-leaning news use had a stronger relationship with the early vaccine belief among Democrats. © 2023 SAGE Publications.

6.
Rural Sociology ; 88(1):162-192, 2023.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2253834

ABSTRACT

This paper draws from a dataset focusing on two rural communities in Colorado (USA). Data collection occurred over two periods: late‐2019 and again during COVID‐19 lockdowns in mid‐2020. The communities differed demographically: one had a growing minoritized population, especially among its youth;the other was overwhelmingly white. The paper troubles the concept of subjective wellbeing (SWB) as it asks about the productive potentials of discomfort, with assistance from such concepts as colorblind ideology, motivated reasoning, and network homophily. While important to think about so‐called positive emotional states in the context of community development, we must also ask questions like, "SWB for who and at whose expense?” How respondents thought about individual‐ and community‐level SWB had much to do with the social networks they were in. I also explore why the community that fared pandemic‐related disruptions, from a SWB standpoint, better than the other performed worse during this same period from an economic (material) standpoint. Sociological factors explain these dynamics, which are leveraged to enhance our understanding of how to conceptualize community development in productive ways. In sum, I argue that certain expressions of discomfort have value and are therefore necessary for creating resilient, flourishing, and, ultimately, just communities.

7.
Applied Cognitive Psychology ; 37(2):319-331, 2023.
Article in English | EMBASE | ID: covidwho-2285656

ABSTRACT

People are motivated to maintain consistency between importantly held identities, preferences, and judgments. In political contexts, motivated reasoning can help explain a wide range of political phenomena, including extremism, polarization, and misperceptions. However, recent findings in psychology have challenged this account. These perspectives emphasize the role of cognitive sophistication (e.g., analytical reasoning, numerical literacy) in political attitudes, but differ in terms of whether it is expected to attenuate or exacerbate politically motivated reasoning and belief in conspiracy theories. Yet prior investigations have not examined the relative and independent effects of both political and cognitive sophistication. Using data from two samples, including one sampled to approximate representativeness in the U.S., we demonstrate that both types of sophistication have independent and (at times) countervailing effects on belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories and other political attitudes. Our results are critical for theories of cognitive sophistication, political cognition, and attitudes, and the psychology of conspiracy theories.Copyright © 2022 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

8.
State Politics & Policy Quarterly ; 23(1):1-25, 2023.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-2264782

ABSTRACT

Democratic accountability relies on voters to punish their representatives for policies they dislike. Yet, a separation-of-powers system can make it hard to know who is to blame, and partisan biases further distort voters' evaluations. During the COVID-19 pandemic, precautionary policies were put into place sometimes by governors, sometimes by mayors, and sometimes by no one at all, allowing us to identify when voters hold out-party versus in-party politicians responsible for policies. With a survey spanning 48 states, we test our theory that attitudes toward policies and parties intersect to determine when selective attribution takes place. We find that as individuals increasingly oppose a policy, they are more likely to blame whichever level of government is led by the out-party. This is most pronounced among partisans with strong in-party biases. We provide important insight into the mechanisms that drive selective attribution and the conditions under which democratic accountability is at risk.

9.
State Politics & Policy Quarterly ; 2022.
Article in English | Web of Science | ID: covidwho-2221735

ABSTRACT

Democratic accountability relies on voters to punish their representatives for policies they dislike. Yet, a separation-of-powers system can make it hard to know who is to blame, and partisan biases further distort voters' evaluations. During the COVID-19 pandemic, precautionary policies were put into place sometimes by governors, sometimes by mayors, and sometimes by no one at all, allowing us to identify when voters hold out-party versus in-party politicians responsible for policies. With a survey spanning 48 states, we test our theory that attitudes toward policies and parties intersect to determine when selective attribution takes place. We find that as individuals increasingly oppose a policy, they are more likely to blame whichever level of government is led by the out-party. This is most pronounced among partisans with strong in-party biases. We provide important insight into the mechanisms that drive selective attribution and the conditions under which democratic accountability is at risk.

10.
Journal of Experimental Political Science ; 2022.
Article in English | Web of Science | ID: covidwho-2185416

ABSTRACT

How does political ideology affect the processing of information incongruent with one's worldview? The disagreement in prior research about this question lies in how one's ideology interacts with cognitive ability to shape motivated numeracy or the tendency to misinterpret data to confirm one's prior beliefs. Our study conceptually replicates and extends previous research on motivated numeracy by testing whether monetary incentives for accuracy lessen motivated reasoning when high- and low-numeracy partisans interpret data about mask mandates and COVID-19 cases. This research leverages the ongoing COVID-19 crisis, as Americans are polarized along party lines regarding an appropriate government response to the pandemic.

11.
Applied Cognitive Psychology ; : No Pagination Specified, 2022.
Article in English | APA PsycInfo | ID: covidwho-2157666

ABSTRACT

People are motivated to maintain consistency between importantly held identities, preferences, and judgments. In political contexts, motivated reasoning can help explain a wide range of political phenomena, including extremism, polarization, and misperceptions. However, recent findings in psychology have challenged this account. These perspectives emphasize the role of cognitive sophistication (e.g., analytical reasoning, numerical literacy) in political attitudes, but differ in terms of whether it is expected to attenuate or exacerbate politically motivated reasoning and belief in conspiracy theories. Yet prior investigations have not examined the relative and independent effects of both political and cognitive sophistication. Using data from two samples, including one sampled to approximate representativeness in the U.S., we demonstrate that both types of sophistication have independent and (at times) countervailing effects on belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories and other political attitudes. Our results are critical for theories of cognitive sophistication, political cognition, and attitudes, and the psychology of conspiracy theories. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved)

12.
Health, Risk & Society ; : 1-22, 2022.
Article in English | Academic Search Complete | ID: covidwho-2134335

ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic has become a partisan issue rather than an independent public health issue in the US. This study examined the behavioural consequences of motivated reasoning and framing by investigating the impacts of COVID-19 news exposure and news frames, as apparent through a Latent Dirichlet topic modelling analysis of local news coverage, on state-level preventive behaviours as understood through a nationally representative survey. Findings suggested that the media effects on various preventive behaviours differed. The overall exposure rate to all COVID-19 news articles increased mask-wearing but did not significantly impact other preventive behaviours. Four news frames significantly increased avoiding contact or avoiding public or crowded places. However, news articles discussing anxiety and stay at home order triggered resistance and countereffects and led to risky behaviours. ‘Solid Republican’ state residents were less likely to avoid contact, avoid public or crowded places, and wear masks. However, partisan leanings did not interfere with the impact of differing local COVID-19 news frames on reported preventive behaviours. Plus, statements regarding pre-existing trust in Trump did not correlate with reported preventive behaviour. Attention to effect sizes revealed that news exposure and news frames could have a bigger impact on health behaviours than motivated reasoning. [ FROM AUTHOR]

13.
Med Decis Making ; 42(8): 1078-1086, 2022 11.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2002006

ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND: During the COVID-19 pandemic, the world witnessed a partisan segregation of beliefs toward the global health crisis and its management. Politically motivated reasoning, the tendency to interpret information in accordance with individual motives to protect valued beliefs rather than objectively considering the facts, could represent a key process involved in the polarization of attitudes. The objective of this study was to explore politically motivated reasoning when participants assess information regarding COVID-19. DESIGN: We carried out a preregistered online experiment using a diverse sample (N = 1,500) from the United States. Both Republicans and Democrats assessed the same COVID-19-related information about the health effects of lockdowns, social distancing, vaccination, hydroxychloroquine, and wearing face masks. RESULTS: At odds with our prestated hypothesis, we found no evidence in line with politically motivated reasoning when interpreting numerical information about COVID-19. Moreover, we found no evidence supporting the idea that numeric ability or cognitive sophistication bolster politically motivated reasoning in the case of COVID-19. Instead, our findings suggest that participants base their assessment on prior beliefs of the matter. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings suggest that politically polarized attitudes toward COVID-19 are more likely to be driven by lack of reasoning than politically motivated reasoning-a finding that opens potential avenues for combating political polarization about important health care topics. HIGHLIGHTS: Participants assessed numerical information regarding the effect of different COVID-19 policies.We found no evidence in line with politically motivated reasoning when interpreting numerical information about COVID-19.Participants tend to base their assessment of COVID-19-related facts on prior beliefs of the matter.Politically polarized attitudes toward COVID-19 are more a result of lack of thinking than partisanship.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Humans , United States/epidemiology , Pandemics , Politics , Hydroxychloroquine , Communicable Disease Control
14.
International Journal of Science Education, Part B: Communication and Public Engagement ; 2022.
Article in English | Scopus | ID: covidwho-1960828

ABSTRACT

The COVID-19 pandemic revealed that many countries have failed to provide the general population with the cognitive tools to thoroughly understand and cope with a global health crisis. While scientists and leaders worldwide have struggled to discover ways to contain the spread of the virus, this difficult task has become overwhelming due to the limited ability of many citizens to grasp the urgency of the situation. Although in today’s digitized world we have endless access to data and more ways to represent information and statistics than ever before, numerous incidents have demonstrated that the frequent misapprehension of data can cause confusion rather than clarity. This opinion paper examines how issues such as the misunderstanding of large quantities, fractions, probabilities, and mathematical modeling may be affecting the way people view the current pandemic. Finally, we also discuss how numeracy can act as a protective factor against motivated reasoning, which often affects how we consume information related to the pandemic. © 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

15.
Philosophical Psychology ; : 1-21, 2022.
Article in English | Academic Search Complete | ID: covidwho-1947882

ABSTRACT

Some collective irrationalities, like epistemically and pragmatically reckless Covid skepticism, are especially dangerous. While we normally have incentives to avoid dangerous beliefs, there are cases in which the danger of a belief is valuable. This is not captured by most accounts of motivated reasoning. I argue that Covid skepticism can function as a costly signal (handicap) so as to more effectively communicate social identity and commitment. [ FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Philosophical Psychology is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full . (Copyright applies to all s.)

16.
Journal of Experimental Political Science ; 9(2):153-161, 2022.
Article in English | ProQuest Central | ID: covidwho-1931283

ABSTRACT

In spite of its immense global impact, Republicans and Democrats disagree on how serious a problem the coronavirus pandemic is. One likely reason is the political elites to whom partisans listen. As a means of shoring up support, President Trump largely downplayed but at times hyped the severity of the virus. Do these messages influence the perceived seriousness of the virus’s death toll, how the president is evaluated as well as support for and compliance with social distancing guidelines? Results suggest that Republican identifiers had by early June crystallized their views on the virus’s seriousness, the president’s performance, and social distancing policies and behaviors. Unexpectedly, information critical of President Trump’s policy decisions produced a backlash causing people to show less concern about the virus’s death toll and rate the president’s performance even more highly.

17.
Political Behavior ; 2022.
Article in English | Scopus | ID: covidwho-1803033

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the social-psychological mechanisms behind how citizens deal with uncertainties stemming from the COVID-19 vaccine developments in societies with prominent social/political cleavages. We argue that existing social/political tensions influence individuals’ trust in institutions that are responsible for coping with crises through a motivated reasoning mechanism, which eventually shapes citizens’ COVID-19 vaccine intentions. Using a nationally representative face-to-face survey conducted in the pre-vaccination period in Turkey, we demonstrate that both self-identifying as a Kurd or feeling close to an opposition party are associated with lower trust in institutions actively dealing with the pandemic, which in turn, results in weaker intentions for getting vaccinated. Testing our full theoretical model reveals that while ethnic and partisan identities do not directly influence vaccine intentions, they exhibit an indirect negative effect via institutional trust impeding the fight against the pandemic. We show that it is difficult to tackle a sudden collective threat that requires public cooperation with health policies if the society is strongly polarized. Our findings offer key policy implications for the vaccination phase of the pandemic, and contribute to the domains of public health, conflict studies and individual judgment and decision-making about social risks. © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature.

18.
Argumentation Library ; 43:355-371, 2022.
Article in English | Scopus | ID: covidwho-1750510

ABSTRACT

During the COVID-19 pandemic, people around the world were bombarded by new information, often provided by experts, such as epidemiologists, virologists, or intensive care specialists. These experts have struggled at convincing the general public to behave in ways that make a way out of the pandemic possible. In this chapter, it is argued that audience acceptance of appeals to experts is conditional in two ways. First, acceptance of expert opinions is conditional upon the degree to which appeals to expert opinions respect critical questions regarding the evaluation of these appeals. Second, acceptance of expert opinions is conditional upon the audience’s prior belief in the claims. It is argued that the most likely factor that has played a role in the lack of influence of experts is the weak consensus between experts when it comes to issues regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. © 2022, The Author(s).

19.
Polit Behav ; : 1-27, 2022 Mar 02.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1729346

ABSTRACT

Political action and electoral behavior often stem from a conviction that an issue is important. Yet despite a growing literature on partisan bias, it remains unclear whether partisan attachment also affects the perceived importance of various issues. We propose a theory of partisan-motivated issue attention (PMIA), wherein citizens satisfy partisan instincts by shifting the perceived importance of an issue. We apply our theory to an issue involving a fundamental tool of the federal government-the power to deficit-spend-and test the hypothesis that partisans' concern about government overspending significantly changes depending on which party presides over deficit-spending. Leveraging pre-registered experimental and observational studies, we find strong support for this hypothesis among both Republicans and Democrats. Lastly, using text analytical methods, we also find evidence of PMIA in televised partisan media. Our study thus demonstrates that putative concern about deficit-spending contains a sizable partisan component and, more broadly, uncovers an additional means by which partisan bias guides citizens' attitude formation on policy-relevant issues in the United States. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-022-09783-5.

20.
Frontiers in Political Science ; 3, 2021.
Article in English | Scopus | ID: covidwho-1715036

ABSTRACT

COVID-19 conspiracy theories have proliferated during the global pandemic, and their rapid spread among certain groups may jeopardize the public health response (e.g., undermining motivation to engage in social distancing and willingness to vaccinate against the virus). Using survey data from two waves of a nationally representative, longitudinal study of life in lockdown in the United Kingdom (N = 1,406), we analyze the factors associated with belief in three origin theories related to COVID-19, namely that it 1) originated in a meat market in Wuhan, China;2) was developed in a lab in Wuhan, China;and 3) is caused by 5G mobile networks. Our findings suggest that political-psychological predispositions are strongly associated with belief in conspiracy theories about the virus, though the direction and effect sizes of these predictors vary depending on the specific content of each origin theory. For instance, belief in the Chinese lab conspiracy theory is strongly associated with right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), social dominance orientation (SDO), and general conspiracy ideation, as well as less reliable news sources, distrust in scientists, and anxiety about the pandemic. Belief in the 5G network conspiracy theory is strongly associated with SDO, distrust in scientists, while less strongly with conspiracy ideation and information from social networks/media;RWA is strongly negatively associated with belief in the 5G conspiracy theory, with older and more wealthy individuals somewhat less likely to endorse it. The meat market origin theory is predicted by intolerance of uncertainty, ethnocentrism, COVID-19 anxiety, and less so by higher income, while distrust in scientists is negatively associated with this origin story. Finally, belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories is associated with negative public health behaviors such as unwillingness to social distance and vaccinate against the virus. Crucially, our findings suggest that the specific content of COVID-19 conspiracy theories likely determines which individuals may be most likely to endorse them. Copyright © 2021 Hartman, Marshall, Stocks, McKay, Bennett, Butter, Gibson Miller, Hyland, Levita, Martinez, Mason, McBride, Murphy, Shevlin, Vallières and Bentall.

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